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ABSTRACT: In the first volume of the History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault states in 
passing that prostitution and pornography, like the sexual sciences of medicine and 
psychiatry, are involved in the proliferation of sexualities and the perverse 
implantation.  Against an influential misinterpretation of this passage on the part of 
film studies scholar Linda Williams, this paper takes up Foucault’s claim and 
attempts to explain the mechanism through which the sex industry, and 
pornography in particular, functions analogously to the sexual sciences in terms of 
the normalizing form of power that Foucault describes.  Whereas Williams sets the 
question of prostitution aside, and argues that pornography must be a confessional 
discourse for Foucault, this paper argues that consumption rather than confession is 
the mechanism through which both prostitution and pornography deploy sexualities 
within a disciplinary system of power. 
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In 1977, Michel Foucault was asked by a government commission how he would like 
to see the laws concerning sexual crimes reformed in France.  In his response he 
made no mention of prostitution and stated briefly that he was opposed to all 
legislation restricting sexually explicit materials.  Prostitution and pornography 
appear to have been easy cases for Foucault, while he went on to say that there were 
only two kinds of sex acts that troubled him with respect to legislation – rape and 
sex with minors – and it is these issues that he contemplated in some detail.1  Lest we 
                                                 
1  Foucault describes this phone call in ‚Confinement, Psychiatry, Prison,‛ where he goes  
on to discuss rape with his interlocutors.   Soon after, in ‚Sexual Morality and the Law,‛ 
he addresses the issue of sex with minors.  See Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed.), Michel 
Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984 (New York 
and London: Routledge: 1988) 178-210 and 271-285.  For critical responses to Foucault’s 
comments on rape and sex with children, see Linda Alcoff, ‚Dangerous Pleasures: 
Foucault and the Politics of Pedophilia,‛ in Susan J. Hekman (ed.), Feminist Interpretations 
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think that sex work was entirely unproblematic for Foucault, however, in The History 
of Sexuality prostitution and pornography are mentioned along with the disciplinary 
professions of medicine and psychiatry as having ‚tapped into both this analytic 
multiplication of pleasure and this optimization of the power that controls it.‛2 
Prostitution and pornography are suggested by Foucault to be involved in the 
workings of disciplinary power as it constructs and controls sexuality, and in this 
sense would be problematic indeed, even if it would make no more sense to resort to 
legislation in the cases of pornography and prostitution than it would in the cases of 
other disciplinary practices such as psychoanalysis and psychiatry.  Since law 
functions on a model of repressive, sovereign or juridical power, it is not very 
effective, and may even be counter-productive, to resort to law in order to resist 
what are in fact disciplinary phenomena. 
  
This paper has two objectives, one negative and one positive.  First, I wish to critique 
Film Studies scholar Linda Williams’ highly influential study of pornography, Hard 
Core: Power, Pleasure, and the ‘Frenzy of the Visible’, which draws on Foucault at length.  
Williams’ 1989 work was groundbreaking in that it was the first study of porno-
graphy that declined to engage in the censorship debate.  Rather than questioning 
whether we should be for or against pornography, Williams approaches porno-
graphy like any other film genre, discussing it seriously in terms of influences and 
techniques.  Williams considers pornography to be a ‚body genre‛ of film much like 
other low-brow genres such as melodrama and horror, which also work to elicit 
physiological responses in the viewer.  Importantly for the current paper, it is one of 
Williams’ central theses in her book to take up Foucault’s association of 
pornography with the disciplinary sciences of medicine and psychiatry in order to 
argue that pornography is a confessional science and participates in the will to know 
about sex.  Moreover, Williams understands Foucault’s situating of pornography 
within his discussion of the perverse implantation to mean that pornography results 
in a positive proliferation of fluid sexualities within individual lives.  Williams’ use 
of Foucault has gone unquestioned in Film and Porn Studies and has been cited and 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Michel Foucault (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1996), 99-135; Vikki Bell, Interrogating Incest: Feminism, Foucault and the Law (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1993); Ann J. Cahill, ‚Foucault, Rape, and the Construction of the 
Feminine Body,‛ Hypatia, 15, vol., no. 1, (Winter 2000); Ann J. Cahill, Rethinking Rape 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001); Laura Hengehold, ‚An Immodest 
Proposal: Foucault, Hysterization, and the ‘Second Rape,’‛ in Hypatia, (Summer 1994): 88-
107; Monique Plaza, ‚Our Damages and Their Compensation,‛ Feminist Issues, 1 (3), 
([1978], 1981): 5-35; Chloë Taylor, ‚Foucault, Feminism and Sex Crimes,‛ in Hypatia, vol.  
24, no. 4, (Fall 2009); Winifred Woodhull, ‚Sexuality, Power, and the Question of Rape,‛ 
in Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby (ed.), Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance, 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), 167-176. 
2  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York: Vintage, 1978), 48. 
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employed authoritatively by numerous other scholars; however, I shall contest both 
Williams’ reading of Foucault and of pornography. 
  
My second and more positive objective in this paper is to offer a new interpretation 
of Foucault’s reference to pornography (and, to a lesser extent, prostitution – which 
Williams sets aside) in The History of Sexuality.  This interpretation is more consistent 
than Williams’ not only with Foucault’s arguments in The History of Sexuality, but 
more importantly, with the manner in which pornography and prostitution actually 
function.  First, I argue that in so far as pornography and prostitution involve 
expertise, they are closer to the ars erotica than to the sexual sciences.  Second, I argue 
that the mechanism by which pornography and prostitution participate in the 
perverse implantation is not confession but consumption.  Consequently, contra 
Williams, we must attend to the consumers rather than to what takes place on set or 
on screen to see how pornography serves its disciplinary function.  Finally, I argue 
that although the perverse implantation deployed by pornography may result in a 
proliferation of sexualities at a society-wide level, on an individual level it is 
constraining rather than liberating, contributing – along with the sexual sciences of 
medicine and psychiatry – to the fixing of each of us into frozen rather than fluid 
sexual identities.   
 
Scientia Sexualis or Ars Erotica? 
Other than his references to specific literary works such as My Secret Life and the 
writings of Sade, Foucault only considers pornography once in the History of 
Sexuality, and what he says is all-too-brief and has been influentially misinterpreted 
by Williams.  In the chapter entitled ‚The Perverse Implantation,‛ Foucault writes:  
 
And accompanying this encroachment of powers, scattered sexualities rigidified, 
became stuck to an age, a place, a type of practice.  A proliferation of sexualities 
through the extension of power; an optimization of the power to which each of 
these local sexualities gave a surface of intervention; this concatenation, 
particularly since the nineteenth century, has been ensured and relayed by the 
countless economic interests which, with the help of medicine, psychiatry, 
prostitution, and pornography, have tapped into both this analytic multiplication of 
pleasure and this optimization of the power that controls it.  Pleasure and power 
do not cancel or turn back against one another; they seek out, overlap, and 
reinforce one another.  They are linked together by complex mechanisms and 
devices of excitation and incitement.3  
 
This citation is interesting for at least two reasons.  First, it helps to explain 
Foucault’s opposition to any censorship of sexually explicit materials.  Foucault’s 
main objective in this reference to prostitution and pornography is not so much to 
                                                 
3  Ibid., 48 (my italics). 
Taylor: Pornographic Confessions 
21 
 
say anything about the sex industry per se, but to reject the strategy of repressing sex 
in order to control it more generally, whether this repression occurs through 
legislation or medicine.  According to Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power as 
productive, the workings of power and the very idea of repression are constitutive 
rather than extinguishers of desire.4  As Foucault argues throughout the first volume 
of the History of Sexuality, when we try to control desire by repressing it we in fact 
produce it, and, as this passage makes clear, Foucault thinks that this is just as true 
with respect to the sex industry as to the medical treatment of perversions. 
 
Second, while in this passage and elsewhere Foucault does not elaborate on the 
relation between the sex industry and the sexual sciences, it is curious that he would 
string together the apparently incongruous bedmates of medicine and psychiatry 
with prostitution and pornography.  Each of these practices is suggested to be 
working towards similar ends within a disciplinary system of power: Foucault 
suggests that pornography and prostitution, like the sexual sciences, are involved in 
a ‚proliferation of sexualities,‛ which proliferation, for Foucault, is in turn caught up 
with ‚the perverse implantation,‛ as the chapter in which this citation occurs 
explains.  Unfortunately, whereas in the case of medicine and psychiatry Foucault 
describes the precise mechanism through which this proliferation and implantation 
of sexualities occurs – confession – he does not give us a similar account of the 
manners in which prostitution and pornography deploy sexualities.  In response to 
this passage, Williams has deduced that pornography simply is a sexual science for 
Foucault, and thus employs the same technology of deployment as the ‚other‛ sexual 
sciences.  Setting the issue of prostitution aside – and even replacing the word 
‚prostitution‛ with ‚law‛ in her reference to this passage5 - Williams has argued that 
pornography is a confessional practice.  As I shall argue below, however, and as is 
suggested by Williams’ own need to switch the word ‚prostitution‛ for the more 
obviously confessional practice of ‚law‛ in her manipulation of Foucault’s phrase, 
this is far from clear.  In fact, to make sense of this citation, we need to understand 
how both pornography and prostitution function to deploy sexualities in a manner 
that is analogous (but not necessarily identical) to the workings of the sexual 
sciences. 
 
In the History of Sexuality and in related works from this time, Foucault argues for 
the disentanglement of sex from truth and identity.  He famously concludes this 
work by proposing that ‚The rallying point for the counterattack against the 
deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.‛6 
                                                 
4  Ibid., 158. 
5  Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the ‚Frenzy of the Visible‛ (Berkeley, CA:  
University of California Press, 1989), 35. 
6  Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 157. 
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Rather than trying to find out what we already or truly are through introspections 
into our sex(uality) and desires, we should work on what we might become, what 
new pleasures and capacities of the body we might discover.  In this initial volume, 
Foucault explores the possibility of mastering the body and its pleasures in terms of 
the Eastern ars erotica.7  A few years later, he would describe this discussion of the ars 
erotica as ‚one of the numerous points where I was wrong in that book,‛ not because 
what he said there was false, but because he ‚should have opposed our science of 
sex to a contrasting practice in our own culture.  The Greeks and Romans did not 
have any ars erotica to be compared with the Chinese ars erotica *<+ They had a 
techne tou biou [care of the self] in which the economy of pleasure played a very large 
role.‛8  Foucault now contrasts the sexual sciences not to Eastern erotic arts, but to 
Greek and Roman practices of self-care, and provides a schematic account of the 
different approaches to sexuality in each of these cultures – the East, the ancient 
West, and the Christian and modern West: 
 
If by sexual behavior, we understand the three poles – acts, pleasure, and desire 
– we have the Greek ‚formula‛ *<+  In this Greek formula what is underscored 
is ‚act,‛ with pleasure and desire as subsidiary: acte – plaisir – (désir).  *<+ 
 
The Chinese ‚formula‛ would be plaisir – désir – (acte).  Acts are put aside 
because you have to restrain acts in order to get the maximum duration and 
intensity of pleasure. 
 
The Christian ‚formula‛ puts an accent on desire and tries to eradicate it.  Acts 
have to become something neutral; you have to act only to produce children, or 
to fulfill your conjugal duty.  And pleasure is both practically and theoretically 
excluded: (désir) – acte – (plaisir).  Desire is practically excluded – you have to 
eradicate your desire – but theoretically very important. 
 
And I could say that the modern ‚formula‛ is desire, which is theoretically 
underlined and practically accepted, since you have to liberate your own desire.  
Acts are not very important, and pleasure – nobody knows what it is!9  
 
The Eastern ars erotica, or the ‚Chinese ‘formula’,‛ assumes pleasure and the 
techniques of mastering the pleasure-capacities of the body to be an area of 
knowledge external to the self that a subject can acquire through corporeal practice 
under the tutelage of a master.  Ancient practices of self-care were concerned with an 
                                                 
7  Ibid., 57-71. 
8  Michel Foucault, ‚On the Genealogy of Ethics,‛ in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow,  
Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 234-235. 
9  Ibid., 242-243. 
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agent’s ability to control his sexual acts or indulgences in pleasure and took little 
interest in desire.  As Foucault writes: 
 
For the Greeks, when a philosopher was in love with a boy, but did not touch 
him, his behavior was valued.  The problem was, does he touch the boy or not.  
That’s the ethical substance: the act linked with pleasure and desire.  For 
Augustine it’s very clear that when he remembers his relationship to his young 
friend when he was eighteen years old, what bothers him is what exactly was the 
kind of desire he had for him.  So, you see that the ethical substance has 
changed.10 
 
The shift that happened between the Ancient Greeks and Augustine, a shift in 
emphasis from acts to desires, is still with us today.  While desire remains the aspect 
of sex which we stress, it has now become positive rather than negative: whereas 
Augustine worried about the nature of his desire in order to better annihilate it, we 
now seek to identify our desires in order to affirm and inhabit our authentic 
sexualities, and we take desire, rather than acts or pleasures, to be the key to 
unlocking the secrets of our souls. 
  
Granted this unprecedented importance, Foucault suggests that desire has 
succeeded in eclipsing sexual acts almost entirely.  With the scientia sexualis there is 
no need to act at all in order to have and to discover our sexualities, we just need to 
think about our personal desires and the types of selves that these constitute.  For 
the scientia sexualis, sexual truth is already in the psyche, if we only introspect on our 
feelings, fantasies, dreams, childhood traumas, repressions and inhibitions.  Sexual 
truth is psychologized, or is specific to each individual and need not be acted upon, 
in contrast to the ars erotica, for which the truths of sexual pleasure are mysteries into 
which one must be initiated, which must be practiced, and which have nothing to do 
with the individual practitioner or her psychic states.   
 
Both the scientia sexualis and the ars erotica have their ‚sexual experts.‛  For the 
scientia sexualis, these are scientists who may or may not have much sexual 
experience or much embodied knowledge of pleasure but who are medically-trained 
decipherers of desire, interpreters of sexual confessions, taxonomers of perversions 
or psychosexual types.  The sexual experts of the ars erotica, on the other hand, are 
trained in the mastery of non-individuated bodies and pleasures.11  Studying the ars 
                                                 
10  Ibid., 238. 
11  Bodies may be individuated in the ars erotica into a few physiological types: for instance,  
in the Kama Sutra, male bodies come in hare, bull, and horse types, and women come in 
deer, mare, and elephant types, according to the size of their genitals.  Bodies also come 
with different degrees of passion – deemed small, middling, or extreme – and the Kama 
Sutra urges lovers to find partners who correspond to themselves in genital size and force 
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erotica would consequently be a deindividualizing practice.  Unlike patients and 
practitioners of the scientia sexualis, an initiate of the ars erotica would not be 
concerned with understanding her own individual sexuality, or the various 
individual sexualities (perversions, etc.) of others, but in understanding the 
pleasures of bodies per se.  While corporeal pleasure is important to the ars erotica, 
the Western obsession with sexual identity has no more place in these Eastern 
practices than it did in the self-mastering techniques of the ancient Greeks. 
 
In Hard Core, as noted, Williams identifies pornography with the scientia sexualis that 
Foucault discusses in the History of Sexuality.  Williams’ initial argument for the 
pornography/sexual science identification involves showing that pornography and 
two modern scientific developments – photography and psychoanalysis – came of 
age together, and share a history that has not been disentangled since.  As Williams 
documents, the scientific inventions of photography were quickly employed to 
produce pornography, while sexual scientists such as Charcot took quasi-
pornographic photographs with titles such as ‚Ècstase.‛  Science, psychiatry, 
psychoanalysis, and pornography thus have an interactive history, and this history 
is one of the grounds for Williams’ blurring of the notions of pornography and 
sexual science.  The use and making of pornographic images in the history of the 
sciences of psychiatry and psychoanalysis is not enough to establish pornography as 
a sexual science, however, or even to say that it is like a science.  Charcot touched 
many things, and early scientist-photographers worked in many genres, but not all 
of these became science.   
 
More significantly, Williams argues that photography and its immediate production 
of pornography are situated in the particularly modern and Western ‚will to know‛ 
about sex, which volonté de savoir is also what motivates the sexual sciences.  
Foucault’s argument is that we, as a society, want to know about sex, since we have 
come to think that sex is the key to understanding who we are, the means to 
realizing both our truth and our happiness.  It is in this context that we participate in 
the studies of the sexual sciences, undergo analysis and self-analysis, and consume 
the books, magazines, and television shows that feature sexological knowledge.  In 
this context, pornography is interpreted by Williams – and by authors who cite 
Williams’ study such as Chris Straayer, Julie Lavigne and Gertrud Koch – as catering 
to this same will to know the truth about sex.  Like sexual scientists in their 
interrogations, Williams thinks that we consume pornography out of the desire to 
hear ‚sex speak‛ or to witness sexual confessions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of passion.  These basic differences in scale are, however, quite different from, and far 
less individualizing than, the psychosexual taxonomies of the sexual sciences. 
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While Williams shows that the sexual and photographic sciences produced 
pornographic images, Koch shows a reverse movement, pointing to cases in which 
pornographers made overtures to the sexual sciences.  She points out that certain 
pornographic films ‛declared their intention to offer practical advice for living, to be 
purveyors of knowledge.  Examples of these are the Oswald Kolle series, or Helga.  
The classification of formal knowledge by category still attaches to an unending 
series of ‘Film Reports,’ often presenting sexual behaviour according to various 
occupations.‛12  Koch goes on to note that certain ‚early porn films displayed a 
lexicographic tendency,‛ and quotes two descriptions from a 1956 essay by Curt 
Moreck: 
 
A special flavour is given to obscene films through the scrupulously realistic 
presentation of every imaginable perversion.  Although life itself very often 
offers the connoisseur a view of simple vice, the chance to enjoy real perversity 
as a spectator is much rarer; in this case, film tries to fill the void.  There are some 
films in this genre which seem to have been staged directly from Krafft-Ebing’s 
Psychopathia Sexualis, as a manual of abnormal sexual operations for civilized 
man.   
 
All the vices of man flickered by on the screen.  Every one of the hundred and 
fifty ways from the old Treatise on the Hundred and Fifty Ways of Loving was 
demonstrated, with occasional interruptions for lesbian, pederast, and 
masturbation jokes.  All that was harmless.  Sadists and masochists waved their 
instruments, sodomy was practiced, coprophagous acts were on display.13 
 
Cases such as Moreck describes indicate that pornography might offer itself as the 
sort of material which the sexual sciences study.  Indeed, Krafft-Ebing used the 
pornographic texts of Sade and Sacher-Masoch to identify the characteristics of 
sadism and masochism.  Some pornographic films could function like the texts of 
Sade and Sacher-Masoch as other illustrations of perversions which the sexual 
scientists might analyze.  As Foucault notes, the anonymous author of My Secret Life 
described the value of his writings as a quasi-scientific contribution to human 
knowledge of sexuality.14  In instances such as these – voluntarily in the cases of My 
Secret Life and the films that Moreck describes, and involuntarily in the cases of Sade 
and Sacher-Masoch – pornography serves as material for the sexual scientists’ 
studies of perversion.  In the case of My Secret Life, because it is the author himself 
who offers his experiences to the scientists, and because the text is written in an 
autobiographical mode, pornography works as the kind of confession which sexual 
scientists elicit from their patients.  In the other cases, the data is more dubious and 
                                                 
12  Gertrud Koch, ‚The Body’s Shadow Realm,‛ in Pamela Church Gibson (ed.), More Dirty  
Looks: Gender, Pornography and Power (London: The British Film Institute, 2004), 155. 
13  Cited in Koch, 155. 
14  Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 22. 
Foucault Studies, No. 7, pp. 18-44 
 26 
involuntarily provided, and Sacher-Masoch was appalled to find a sexual perversion 
named after himself in the Psychopathia Sexualis on the basis of his literary works.   
 
Although this shows that some pornographers have justified the existence of their 
work by claiming to contribute to scientific knowledge, and a few have done so in an 
autobiographical or confessional mode, it is surely the case that most pornography is 
not autobiographical and is not offered up as quasi-scientific information about 
human sexuality, but as fiction and fantasy.  Significantly, while anti-pornography 
feminists have regularly claimed that pornography reflects and reinscribes (a 
misogynist) reality, the pornography industry and its defenders persistently argue 
that their opponents are failing to distinguish between fantasy and reality.  
Pornography, they argue, is not truth but fantasy, and the people who consume it 
realize this.  The value of pornography to society is defended as art and imagination, 
and not as science, knowledge, or truth. 
  
While Koch’s study, like Foucault’s discussion of My Secret Life, is interesting in that 
it shows that some works of pornography have engaged with and even hoped to 
contribute to or collaborate with the sexual sciences, this is not a feature of most 
pornography, either in the nineteenth century or today.  It is in fact highly 
questionable whether pornography arises primarily out of a ‚will to know‛ about 
sex at all.  For one thing, mass-produced and circulated pornography pre-existed the 
volonté de savoir that Foucault describes.  While Williams begins her study of the 
history of pornography with the invention of photography in the nineteenth century, 
thus making it contemporary with Charcot, she might have begun with the 
invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century instead.  Like the invention of 
the camera, the invention of the printing press quickly gave rise to the mass 
production and circulation of pornographic works, such as Guilio Romano’s 1520 
series, I modi, and this well before the age of the ‚will to know‛ about sex that 
Foucault describes.15  It is thus quite possible for a society to make, distribute, and 
consume pornography on a large scale with non-epistemological motivations and 
prior to the existence of the sexual sciences, and this leads me to doubt that the 
primary impulse behind the production and consumption of pornography is any 
more part of a volonté de savoir today than it was in the 1520s. 
  
Of course, pornography might function very differently today than it did in the 
Renaissance, and yet even in this age of the will to know about sex, it is far from 
clear that it is in the spirit of knowledge that pornography is either made or 
consumed.  Do people consume pornography to learn about sexual pleasure or to 
                                                 
15  Bette Talvacchia, Taking Positions: On the Erotic in Renaissance Culture  (Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 1999) 
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have it? Is pornography primarily about satisfying curiosity or desire? Is porno-
graphy an epistemological endeavor or a masturbatory aid? Are these necessarily 
inter-related? Epistemological pursuits may certainly be prurient, and Foucault 
himself characterizes fin-de-siècle medicine as ‚a pornography of the morbid,‛16 but 
does all sexual pleasure today seek the truth of sex? Williams seems to think that it 
does, for she even includes peep shows under the umbrella of the ‚scientific will-to-
knowledge.‛17 
 
I have no doubt that people look at pornography with some intellectual curiosity 
and that it can play an educative role, for better or for worse, but I am not sure that 
this educative role is the primary motivation or function of pornography, its 
explanation or raison d’être.  According to one poll, eight-six percent of respondants 
think that pornography is educational, and Pamela Paul writes that young men in 
particular may use pornography ‚to figure out what women want and expect from 
sex.  In fact, studies show that men learn from and emulate what they see in 
pornography.‛18  I shall argue below that mainstream heterosexual pornography 
does not so much educate men in women’s desires as construct a fantasy for men 
according to which women’s desires and pleasures correspond to their own.  
Something similar might be said about prostitution, which is also often used for 
male sexual initiation and education, but which in fact probably teaches men very 
little about women’s actual pleasures or desires.  Here, however, I want to argue that 
in so far as advocates say that pornography (or prostitution) is educational, they 
mean that it teaches sexual skills or techniques, not truths about the psychosexualities 
and desires of the individuals on-screen or employed.  This, for Foucault, would 
situate pornography (and prostitution) closer to the ars erotica than the scientia 
sexualis.  To recall, the sexual experts of the ars erotica are trained in practices that 
bring about pleasure and have mastered an art of manipulating bodies, while the 
sexual experts of the scientia sexualis are trained in diagnosing psychological 
perversions and interpreting desires.  If porn stars (and prostitutes) are ‚sexual 
experts‛ of a sort, capable of contributing to the sexual education of consumers, it is 
in the manner of the ars erotica and not of the sexual sciences. 
  
Let it be granted, then, that pornography can serve a pedagogical function, as is so 
frequently claimed.  It is nevertheless not clear that this situates pornography on the 
side of the sexual sciences, and moreover it is not clear that this is very often the 
main purpose in consuming pornography, or that it is a consumer’s primary 
                                                 
16  Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 54. 
17  Williams, 51. 
18  Pamela Paul, Pornified: How Pornography is Damaging Our Lives, Our Relationships, and Our  
Families (New York: Times Books, 2005), 18. 
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motivation or merely a side-effect.  Since pornography tends to be repetitious, it also 
seems unlikely that viewers continue to watch pornography for its educational 
function.  After a short time, one has likely learned what pornography has to teach, 
but many go on watching pornography for other reasons, which reasons were 
probably the main motivation in the first place. 
   
Setting these questions aside, even if we were to accept Williams’ assumption that 
pornography arises and is consumed out of a will to know about sex, it is important 
to note that not everything that engages in this volonté de savoir becomes a sexual 
science.  Foucault himself observes that the desire to confess and to hear confessed 
the truths of sex quickly expanded beyond the scientific realm, and finds expression 
today in our intimate conversations with family members, friends, and lovers and in 
‚‘scandalous’ literature.‛19  Indeed, the confessional impulse does not merely 
characterize our speaking about sex, for Foucault, but modern subjectivity more 
generally, or the wide-spread trend toward psychologization.  For instance, Foucault 
discuss the manners in which criminal law became psychiatrized and involves 
confessional practices in the modern era, even in cases which have nothing to do 
with sexuality.20  For Foucault, this does not transform law, ‚scandalous literature,‛ 
or pillow talk into science, although it indicates that they interact with the human 
sciences in interesting and problematic ways.   
 
“Confessional Frenzy”? 
Williams, however, argues that pornography in general (and not only in a few 
autobiographical instances) is a sexual science, and that it functions in our society as 
the sort of confession which the sexual sciences elicit and which Foucault examined.  
According to Williams, pornography is consumed as a confessional genre, and as a 
confessional source of truthful information about female pleasure in particular.  She 
writes that pornography has ‚the goal of making visible the involuntary confession 
of bodily pleasure.‛21 In this way ‚We begin to see *<+ how this sexual science gives 
form to the ‘truths’ that are confessed.‛22  In particular, ‚Hard core desires assurance 
that it is witnessing not the voluntary performance of feminine pleasure, but its 
involuntary confession.‛23 Pornography, according to Williams, is not just 
                                                 
19  Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 21. 
20  Michel Foucault, ‚Confinement, Psychiatry, Prison,‛ and ‚The Dangerous Individual,‛ in  
Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed.), Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1977-1984 (New York and London: Routledge, 1988), 178-210 and 125-151. 
21  Williams, 50. 
22   Ibid., 48. 
23  Ibid.,, 50.  
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confessional but a ‚confessional frenzy,‛24 and ‚proceeds by soliciting further 
confessions of the hidden secrets of female pleasure.‛25 
 
Although the last formulation, with its language of soliciting rather than staging 
‚confessions‛ from porn stars, obscures the point, the more sophisticated version of 
Williams’ argument is not that the porn stars are actually confessing, but that 
pornography aims to produce the illusion of confession, and that pornographic films 
are consumed as confessions.  Referring to Diderot’s tale of the speaking sex, as 
discussed by Foucault, Williams writes that ‚Motion pictures *pornography+ take 
over from the magic of Mongogul’s silver ring to offer the illusion of a more truthful, 
hard-core confession.‛26  Williams thus realizes that it is in fact male directors 
catering to male viewers who have been doing most of the ‚speaking‛ in 
pornography, so that if male viewers think that they are ‚hearing‛ confessions of 
female pleasure ‚spoken‛ through close-ups of female genitals engaged in real sex, 
this involves mostly male pornographers ventriloquizing their voices into the vulvas 
of their female stars.  However, Williams asserts that this is equally true of the 
‚other‛ sexual sciences: 
  
Freud’s theory of the fetish develops out of a particular way of seeing women as 
‘lacking’ that cinema participates in as well.  Neither institution actually reflects 
the confessional truths they purport to record; rather, they produce these truths 
in their new forms of power and pleasure.27 
 
In other words, Freud and Charcot do not give us the unadulterated confessions of 
their female patients any more than the pornographers do, and yet what they said, 
like the images that the pornographers produce, is productive of truth.  Doctors and 
pornographers, according to Williams, both give us confessions of female pleasure 
as seen through the lens of male interpretation and desire in manners that do not so 
much reflect as construct the truth of female sexuality.  In one example, Williams 
describes staged photographs of a faked hysterical attack by the photographer 
Muybridge as other ‚‘confessions’ of a female body.‛28  Even pornographic literature 
written by male writers is interpreted by Williams as ‚confessions‛ of female 
pleasure:  
 
there is not much difference between literary confessions (written by men but 
often focused on women) of female pleasure *<+ and the more direct and 
graphic confession of pleasure by women’s bodies in hard core.  Both are 
                                                 
24  Ibid., 122. 
25  Ibid., 53. 
26  Ibid., 32. 
27  Ibid., 46. 
28  Ibid., 47-48. 
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examples of men speaking about women’s sex to other men; both want to know 
more about the pleasures of women *<+.29 
  
Williams suggests that if Fanny Hill, written by John Cleland, is read as a confession 
of female pleasure, then so can pornography be – but does anyone read Fanny Hill 
this way?  
 
In any case, porn stars, especially female porn stars, like the model who faked a 
hysterical fit for Muybridge, or the ‚hysterics‛ who performed for Charcot, are thus 
not really confessing, for Williams, but she claims that they are viewed as confessing, 
especially during their ‚involuntary convulsions‛ or orgasms, authentic or 
otherwise, and that their performances function as confessions in the production of 
knowledge about sex.  According to Williams, it is because we watch pornography 
to see confessions that the orgasm must be as visible as possible, as evidenced by the 
de rigueur ‚money shot‛ in the case of male porn stars.  For Williams, it is a major 
problem for the pornography industry that women do not (usually) produce 
similarly visible ‚confessions,‛ when ‚involuntary confessions of pleasure‛ –
especially female pleasure – is what hard core is all about.   
 
Many objections can be raised here.  To begin with a relatively small one, it is not 
clear why Williams consistently associates pornographic orgasms with 
involuntariness.  In the case of ‚money shots,‛ which Williams repeatedly calls 
‚involuntary confessions of pleasure,‛ Williams herself tells us that male porn stars 
are paid extra for these scenes, and thus certainly intend them.  It is also not clear 
that confessions in general should be characterized as ‚involuntary.‛ While Foucault 
stresses that confessions are authenticated by the inhibitions that they overcome, this 
does not make them involuntary but rather feats of voluntary effort.  In a legal 
context, an involuntary statement does not qualify as a confession at all.  In 
literature, texts written in the third person and texts in which the first person 
narrator’s name does not correspond with the author’s name (for instance, Fanny 
Hill does not correspond with John Cleland) are also not considered confessional.30 
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault describes confession as ‚a ritual of discourse 
where the subject who speaks corresponds with the subject of the statement,‛31 
which cannot be said for any of the cases which Williams is calling ‚confession.‛ 
  
Our everyday as well as Foucault’s use of the term ‚confession‛ refers to a truthful 
statement made by one person to another about herself, whether this statement 
                                                 
29  Ibid., 55-56. 
30  Philippe Lejeune, ‚Le pacte autobiographique,‛ in Philippe Lejeune, Le pacte Autobio- 
graphique (Paris: Seuil, 1975), 13-46.  
31  Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 61. 
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refers to something she has done, felt, or had done to her.  Not every statement we 
make about ourselves is considered to be a confession, however: calling a statement 
a confession implies that it speaks of something that is shameful, difficult to say, or 
revelatory of who the speaker is.  According to Foucault, confession is a discursive 
act that individuates us, and it is one of the privileged forms of truth-telling and self-
constitution in our culture.  In ‚Subjectivity and Truth‛ Foucault defines confession 
as: ‚To declare aloud and intelligibly the truth of oneself.‛32   In The History of 
Sexuality, confession is ‚a ritual which unfolds in a relation of power, since one 
doesn’t confess without the presence, at least the virtual presence, of a partner who 
is not simply an interlocutor but the agency that requires the confession, imposes it, 
weighs it, and intervenes to judge, punish, pardon, console, reconcile.‛33 For 
Foucault, confession is also ‚a ritual where truth is authenticated by the obstacles 
and resistances that it has had to lift in order to be formulated,‛ or one that is always 
told with difficulty and shame.  Finally, it is a discursive act in which ‚articulation 
alone, independently of its external consequences, produces, in the person who 
articulates it, intrinsic modifications: it makes him innocent, it redeems him, purifies 
him, promises him salvation.‛34  In a later essay, ‚Christianity and Confession,‛ 
Foucault furthermore makes clear that confession must be verbal and not merely 
performative.  To make this point, he recounts a story from Cassian in which a monk 
who stole a loaf of bread each day experiences repentance during a sermon, and 
therefore performatively reveals to those congregated the loaf of bread hidden under 
his robes, and then confesses verbally to having stolen and eaten a loaf each day.  
Only when he makes a verbal confession does ‚a light *seem+ to tear itself away 
from his body and cross the room, spreading a disgusting smell of sulphur.‛35  Satan 
and his temptations were not dislodged from the monk at the moment that he felt 
contrition, nor at the moment that he displayed the stolen loaf to his fellows and 
thus theatrically exposed his guilt.  Only when he confessed his wrongdoing in 
words was the Devil forced from his body.  Foucault uses this story to argue that 
confession is discursive rather than performative, unlike earlier, pre-confessional 
forms of Christian penance. 
  
To summarize Foucault’s understanding of this crucial Western practice of truth-
telling, confession is interpersonal, discursive, autobiographical, difficult or 
shameful, and subject-forming.  This said, can pornography be described as 
                                                 
32  Michel Foucault, ‚Subjectivity and Truth,‛ in The Politics of Truth.  Los Angeles, CA:  
Semiotext(e), (1997), 173. 
33  Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 61. 
34  Ibid., 62. 
35  Michel Foucault, ‚Christianity and Confession,‛ in The Politics of Truth.  Los Angeles, CA:  
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confessional according to Foucault’s analysis of confession? Contra Williams, I 
would argue that it cannot for the following reasons.  First, the relation between 
actors and viewers in pornography is not an interpersonal one, and the acts involved 
are theatrical performances rather than discursive acts.  Moreover, although this 
point requires more explanation, it does not seem to me that the actors are 
overcoming inhibitions in order to confess/perform pleasures which are subject-
forming, constitutive of their identities, or individuating.  Performing in a 
pornographic film, like engaging in prostitution, may be taken as constitutive of 
psychosexual subjectivity in the modern West in that it is assumed to damage the 
sex worker’s authentic sexuality.36  In this case, however, her authentic sexuality is 
not what gets performed in either the brothel or the set, but is what gets obscured in 
this process.  According to this negative view of pornography, what we see in a 
pornographic film is not an expression of the porn star’s sexuality, but a possibly 
permanent and damaging obscuration of it.   
 
Another way that pornographic performances may be constitutive of sexual identity 
in the eyes of viewers and for the stars themselves is insofar as such performances 
constitute her according to the identity of ‚sex worker‛ or ‚whore,‛ regardless of the 
nature of the particular sex acts in which she is engaged;  in other words, performing 
as a dominatrix in a pornographic film does not constitute the actress as a 
dominatrix in her own eyes or those of her viewers, but it may constitute her as a sex 
worker or a whore, with all the stigmatization that this entails in a society such as 
ours.  Men interviewed in Pornified note that they would not date or marry the 
actresses who arouse them, precisely because of the type of woman that performing 
in pornographic films makes them.  Performing in pornographic films functions to 
constitute actors as porn stars/whores for their viewers and probably for themselves, 
whatever (possibly more positive) meaning this has for them, but it does not 
constitute them as, say, lesbians if they engage in lesbian sex scenes, or 
sadomasochists if they perform in s/m scenes, for the precise reason that they engage 
in these acts as theatrical performances and they are consumed as such.  Williams is not 
arguing that the porn stars are seen as confessing to being porn stars, however, but 
that they are seen as confessing to pleasure, to truths about female sexuality, or to 
their own feminine pleasure in particular acts, which does not seem to be the case. 
  
Most importantly, it seems to me that no one considers the majority of pornographic 
films to be confessions for the very simple reason that they are fictional and not 
autobiographies or documentaries.  Pornography does not declare itself to be a 
truth-telling genre, but fantasy catering to the desires of its viewers (not its actors), 
                                                 
36  This view is widespread, but see, for instance, Igor Primoratz, ‚What’s Wrong with  
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whereas, as Philippe Lejeune has argued, confessional texts are to be understood as 
quasi-legalistic and particularly authentic cases of truth-telling or self-revelation.37 
Peter Brooks, in his study of confession, notes that ‚Western literature has made the 
confessional mode a crucial kind of self-expression that is supposed to bear a special 
stamp of sincerity and authenticity and to bear special witness to the truth of the 
individual personality.‛38 We do not consider a pornographic sex scene to be 
particularly sincere, or to be any more confessional than a Hollywood sex scene, 
even though, unlike in Hollywood films, porn stars are having real sex, as 
demonstrated by the all important ‚meat shots‛ and ‚money shots‛ that characterize 
hard-core.  Although the act or sex is real, it is not true: porn stars are not telling the 
truth of their sex or their desire.  We see acts and maybe pleasures in porn, but we do 
not know (and, as I shall argue below, I do not think that we care) if we are seeing 
desire.  In this sense, again, pornography seems closer to the ars erotica than to the 
scientia sexualis. 
 
Throughout Hard Core, Williams fails to distinguish between reality and truth, or real 
sex and the truth of an individual’s sexuality, and between acts and pleasure on the one 
hand, and sexuality and desire on the other.  For Foucault, however, these are crucial 
distinctions, indicative of the epistemic transition to modernity, or the shift in 
importance from act to actor, deed to desire.39  An individual may be considered a 
pedophile even if he has never acted on his desires, but only demonstrated them 
through certain fantasies, consuming certain literature or websites, just as a person 
may consider herself to be bisexual even if she has only had heterosexual sex, on the 
basis of her longings.  We evidently think that the sexual acts we perform in reality 
may have little to do with the truth of our sex.  For this reason, as Foucault makes 
clear in The History of Sexuality, sexual confessions (and even legal or criminal 
confessions) may or may not be about what a person really does, but they are always 
                                                 
37  Lejeune, 13-46. 
38  Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature  (Chicago, IL:  
Chicago University Press, 2000), 18. 
39  Foucault stresses this shift towards psychologization in many contexts.  As seen above,  
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Foucault makes this point frequently, for instance in ‚Confinement, Psychiatry, Prison,‛ 
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and more importantly concerned with what he or she wants to do.  This is why 
confessions are importantly discursive rather than theatrical.  While Williams thinks 
that pornography is confessional precisely because it uses bright lights and close-up 
camera shots, or is a ‚frenzy of the visible,‛ confessions are in fact about the 
invisible, what cannot be seen and must therefore be said – or whispered.  Contra 
Williams, the invisibility of the female orgasm in fact poses no problem at all for a 
confessional discourse, even if it poses a problem for pornography. 
 
In the case of hard-core, we know that the actors are having real sex, and even that 
the male actors are having real orgasms or some degree of real pleasure, even if they 
need to take Viagra to achieve it.  However, we have no idea how they feel about it, 
what their intentions and motivations are, what histories led up to their being where 
they are, or if either the male or the female actors are expressing the truth of their 
desires.  What Williams does not see in her repeated references to these so-called 
‚involuntary confessions of pleasure‛ is that, confessionally-speaking, pleasure is 
not nearly as important as desire, and meat shots and money shots do not tell us 
about desire – or, in a point to which I shall return below, at least not about the 
desires of the actors. 
  
Significantly for Williams’ argument, I also do not think that most consumers of 
pornography are concerned about the authenticity (or truthfulness) of the actor’s 
pleasures and desires, and this again indicates that they do not consume porn as a 
confessional genre or out of a ‚will to know‛ about the sex(uality) of those on-
screen.  One indication of this is that although there is a widespread belief that many 
actresses in pornographic films are sexually exploited and abused, this does not 
seem to change the experience of viewers, indicating that they are not interested in 
what the porn star’s true desires, pleasures, or psychic states are, as long as she 
performs well and the sex is real.40  
                                                 
40  In At Home with Pornography: Women, Sex, and Everyday Life (New York: New York Uni- 
versity Press, 1998), Jane Juffer discusses the case of one porn film in which the porn stars 
are supposedly performing their own desires.  The marketing gimmick for this work is 
that it is allegedly undirected, and so provides viewers with a rare opportunity to see 
porn stars expressing their true sexualities and pursuing their actual fantasies. Juffer 
writes: 
 
In Venom, a popular selection produced by Vidco Home Video, ten porn 
stars perform a vast number of sex acts in what is billed as an expression of 
their authentic and outrageous sexualities.  Says producer Henri Pachard 
before the MTV-style video begins, ‘You’re going to see something 
different – exhibitionists given the freedom to expose nasty sexual urges 
that will amaze a viewer.  This extremely personal approach causes the 
performers to become very vulnerable< They’re not fucking for you.  
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My experience of watching porn with men who are frequent consumers has 
indicated that they notice – and are not favorably impressed – when a porn actress 
diverges from the standard porn script, for instance by looking directly into the 
camera rather than at her partner(s) in the scene.  Of course, the direct gaze of the 
porn star may be experienced as a challenge to the voyeuristic pleasure of the 
viewer, or as a reminder of the presence of a cameraman at whom she really looks, 
but when my viewing companions have said ‚she isn’t supposed to look at the 
camera‛ at moments such as these, or when they even more frequently comment on 
whether the actress is doing a ‚good job‛ or a ‚bad job,‛ this has made me realize 
that they do not want an authentic performance or a genuine encounter with the 
actress, that they do not want windows into her soul or her sexuality, but a well-
performed adherence to a standard pornographic script.  If the direct gaze is any 
indication of what she is really thinking, they do not ‚will to know‛ this truth. 
  
Finally, as seen above, Williams does not just argue that consumers watch porn out 
of a ‚will to know‛ about pleasure (rather than, more obviously, to have pleasure), 
but out of a will to know about female pleasure in particular.  Williams convincingly 
demonstrates that in contrast to the stag films that preceded it, mainstream hardcore 
pornography makes some efforts to problematize and represent female pleasure.  
Indeed, men interviewed in Pornified stress that they enjoy pornography because the 
women are more enthusiastic and pleased by sex than women are in real life.  As 
Pamela Paul writes, ‚Of all the requirements for enjoyable pornography, men most 
commonly cite the appearance of a woman’s reciprocal pleasure as key.‛41  As 
‚Ethan‛ says, for instance: ‚Women in porn tend to act like sex is earth-shattering 
                                                                                                                                                 
They’re not fucking for me.  They’re fucking for themselves.’  We’re thus 
positioned before the video begins to view pornography as something 
performers do for their own pleasures; they are at heart exhibitionists, not 
victims, as governmental discourse would have it.  Furthermore, you, the 
viewer, are the invader on what is essentially a private act; says Pachard, 
‘If you begin to feel that you’re invading their privacy, you are.’ Pachard 
appeals to the illicit thrill of voyeurism and yet legitimates pornography as 
a private, fully consensual act.  (Juffer, 60) 
 
We may be skeptical, as Juffer seems to be, about whether even this video shows the  
authentic sexuality of the porn stars, or that many viewers accept this.  Importantly, 
however, it is presented by the producer himself as ‚something different,‛ indicating that 
in other porn the actors are not expressing their true sexualities or pursuing their real 
fantasies, or are not fucking for themselves but for the director and the viewer.  By 
presenting this particular video as confessional, there is an acknowledgement that 
normally what porn actors are doing is not confessional, or is not a performance of their 
own personal fantasies, but those of the intended viewers. 
41  Paul, 45. 
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even though in reality, sex isn’t like that all the time.  Unfortunately<‛42  This 
citation shows that consumers of pornography do not think that pornography 
represents reality, even if this fantasy may come to construct their desires and even 
their expectations in ‚real life.‛ It also shows that many consumers of pornography 
want to see female pleasure represented (even if they know it is faked), and the 
pornography industry caters to this desire.  Unlike sexual scientists such as Kinsey, 
however, the mainstream heterosexual pornography industry that Williams is 
discussing did not solicit confessions from women about their pleasures and then go 
about trying to capture true or even real female pleasure based on this information.  
It did not direct male porn stars to perform the acts that real women (or the female 
porn stars themselves) say they like in lieu of the usual anal penetration, fellatio, and 
money shots, for instance, which is what we might have expected had Williams’ 
thesis been true, or had pornography really been participating in the will to know 
and to tell the truth about female pleasure.  Instead, the acts represented in 
mainstream heterosexual pornographic films did not change very much – there is 
still a great deal of fellatio, in some numbers this is just about all there is, and very 
often it occurs as the climactic scene, compared to far less frequent and shorter 
(‚foreplay‛) scenes of cunnilingus (and this usually only in films marketed as 
‚couples’ porn‛), while the ‚money shot‛ remains a near-constant.  The male 
orgasm and not the female orgasm is the conclusion to almost all pornographic 
numbers (even in ‚couples’ porn‛), even if now the female stars seem to enjoy 
receiving the product of the male orgasm as much as the male stars enjoy producing 
it. 
  
As Julie Lavigne has argued, this is equally true of amateur pornography, which, 
today, we might have expected to be the confessional sub-category of porn if ever 
there was one.43  In fact, as Lavigne points out, amateur pornography for the most 
part emulates the professional mainstream.  This suggests that amateur 
pornographers with their home videos are not interested in revealing the truths of 
their individual sexualities any more than their professional counterparts, but are 
instead engaged in performing according to the standards, norms, and expectations 
established by the professional pornography into which they are thoroughly 
assimilated – as, perhaps, most of us now are.  Pornographers, then, whether 
professional or amateur, have gone on representing the same things as always, but 
now they bother to insist that these acts give women pleasure too.  If pornography 
produced primarily for men is interested in representing female pleasure, it is not the 
                                                 
42  Ibid., 14. 
43  Julie Lavigne, ‚Érotisme féministe en art ou métapornographie.  Le sexe selon Carolee  
Schneemann, Annie Sprinkle, et Natacha Merritt,‛ Symposium: Canadian Journal of 
Continental Philosophy,  11 (2), (Fall 2007), 364. 
 
Taylor: Pornographic Confessions 
37 
 
truth or even the reality of female pleasure that it is after, but rather the fantasy 
according to which female pleasure results from the same acts that give men 
pleasure.   
 
The paradigmatic example of this point is of course Deep Throat, in which a woman’s 
clitoris is located at the bottom of her throat such that she can only attain orgasm by 
fellating men.  The film is ostensibly about a woman’s quest for sexual pleasure, and 
yet, as a result of an anatomical peculiarity that no viewer takes as ‚scientific fact‛ or 
as a ‚true confession‛ on the part of Linda Lovelace, that female pleasure 
corresponds to male pleasure in being fellated.  In films like Deep Throat this is a silly 
and self-conscious fiction, while the ‚sexual scientist‛ in the film appears as a 
buffoon, and yet Williams reads the film and the role of the sexual scientist within 
the film to be an instance of pornography as sexual science in pursuit of truthful 
knowledge of female pleasure via confession.44  
  
Along these lines, Williams interprets the pornographic representation of rape, in 
which the victim eventually ‚confesses‛ to pleasure ‚despite herself‛ (or appears to 
enjoy the rape), as arising from the greater confessional value of an involuntary 
admission of pleasure.  However, as Williams herself writes, scenes such as these 
‚vindicate *the male viewer’s+ desire to believe that what he enjoys, she enjoys,‛45 
much like the plot of Deep Throat.  The fantasy world of much pornography 
produced for men is one in which women enjoy doing or having done to them what 
gives men pleasure.  Such a fantasy is surely soothing in an era when women are 
demanding their own pleasure (which may not necessarily correspond with what 
brings men pleasure), and are judging men on their performance with the option of 
shopping around for better lovers should men fail to perform.46  
 
As seen, Williams uses Foucault’s account of Diderot’s tale, ‚The Indiscreet Jewels,‛ 
to describe pornography; however, if mainstream hard-core pornography gets the 
female genitals to speak, as Williams herself realizes, it is only to have them say 
what men want to hear.  Most mainstream pornography, unlike some sexual 
scientists and unlike the prince in Diderot’s story, does not express a genuine 
interest in what the female genitals would have to say.  Proof that the pornography 
industry as well as viewers are aware of the fact that pornography is catering to the 
desires of viewers, rather than revealing the desires of actors, is that when the 
pornography industry began to target a female audience (or heterosexual couples), 
                                                 
44  Williams, 112-113. 
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46  See, for instance, Anne Koedt’s article, ‚The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm.‛ in The CWLU 
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the films it made were somewhat different.  If pornographers really believed that 
women have the same desires and pleasures as men, the idea of making 
heterosexual couples’ porn different from men’s porn would not have occurred. 
  
Williams acknowledges that in most hard-core ‚confessions of pleasure‛ it is the 
men who have done the talking and what we see is merely the ‚illusion‛ of a female 
confession.  But is it even that?  On what understanding of ‚confession‛ does 
Williams make these arguments?  As seen, it is not Foucault’s understanding of 
confession, although it is Foucault’s account of confession on which she is ostensibly 
drawing, and it is not that of literary and legal theorists of confession either, and it is 
not even our ‚everyday‛ understanding of the term.  Contra Williams, mainstream 
pornography is not The Vagina Monologues, and most men do not watch 
pornography primarily to know about women’s truths or women’s pleasure or 
men’s pleasure either, but to have their own pleasures.  The medium of this pleasure 
is understood by consumers to be fantasy rather than quasi-scientific non-fiction or 
confessional autobiography, and their objective is orgasmic rather than 
epistemological, self- rather than other-oriented. 
  
The Perverse Implantation and the Proliferation of Sexualities 
Until now I have argued that pornography is not confessional, by which I have 
meant that the sexual performances that we see in pornographic films are almost 
never marketed as or understood as revelations of the sexual truths of the actors, or 
as sexual truths at all.  Now, however, I want to argue that there is a quasi-
confessional aspect to pornographic practices, but that it does not occur on the side 
of what is produced by the pornography industry or what we see on the screen, as 
Williams argues, but on the side of the viewer.  If anyone does anything like confess 
in the realm of pornography, it is not the actors but the consumers.  In fact, this is 
what should have followed from Williams’ comparison of pornography to the sexual 
sciences.  After all, what the sexual sciences do is not to provide us with sexual 
confessions but to elicit them from us.  By her own logic, then, if pornography were 
like the sexual sciences, it would not give us confessions but would extract them from 
us.  As seen above, confessions, for Foucault, are individuating and subject-forming, 
and are more about desires than acts or pleasures.  While I do not think that 
pornographic films are individuating, revelatory, or constructive of the sexuality of 
the actors, other than in so far as they constitute them as sex workers, and while I do 
not think that they are consumed as revelations of the true desires of the actors 
either, I will now suggest that they are revelatory and constitutive of the desires and 
sexuality of those who consume them.   
 
I have said above that the educative role of pornography, such as it is, is closer to 
that of the ars erotica than the sexual sciences, because porn stars, as ‚sexual experts,‛ 
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teach viewers (especially younger viewers) techniques in the mastery of bodies and 
pleasures – even if, in fact, and due to the constraints of their profession rather than 
to personal failings, they are often bad experts or provide a bad education, as I have 
also argued.  This is to be contrasted with the kind of knowledge provided by the 
sexual sciences, which consists of individuating, confessional truths about the 
confessant’s sexuality or desires.  I now want to argue that there is a manner in 
which pornography educates us about individuated sexualities and desires in a 
manner comparable to the scientia sexualis after all; however, the sexualities or 
desires in question are not on the screen, nor are they related to ‚female pleasure‛ in 
general, as Williams argues.  The desires and sexuality in question are those of the 
consumer, whether male or female.  The pornography that viewers choose to watch, 
and the acts and actors that arouse them, reveal to viewers their desires and thus 
contribute to the identification and constitution of their sexualities.  I am suggesting 
that something comparable to confession is found in pornography, but that it is 
found in the experience of consumption.  This consumption, like confession, 
participates in the perverse implantation and the proliferation of sexualities. 
 
Foucault argues in The History of Sexuality that far from there having been a 
repression of sexuality and perversions in the modern West, there has been a 
proliferation of sexualities and an implantation of perversions.  Indeed, it is precisely 
those practices and discourses that were aimed at repressing perverse sexualities – 
those of the sexual sciences in particular – which led to this proliferation and 
implantation.  In order to control perverse sexualities, modern Western societies 
believed that they had to first understand them, and thus set out to discover, 
categorize, and study individual sexual perversions.  Ironically, the consequence of 
these activities was not a reduction of perversions but their explosive deployment.  
Studying sexual perversions meant studying the people who engaged in perverse 
acts and identifying these individuals according to their desires.  In the process, 
according to Foucault, sexual identities were not so much revealed as discursively 
produced.  This was an unanticipated but not entirely negative effect of the sexual 
sciences.  Only by being identified by their so-called perversion, and by taking on 
this identity for themselves in the process, could sexual sub-cultures be established, 
giving their own meanings to the sexual identities according to which they had been 
categorized.  Despite this result, Foucault is troubled that we are now each fixed to a 
specific sexuality and that this sexuality is taken as our identity, supposedly 
structuring everything that we do.  For Foucault, discovering one’s sexuality is not 
liberating: on the contrary, there is a lack of sexual freedom once a particular 
sexuality is implanted as who we are.   
 
Importantly, Foucault’s claim is not that sexualities or perversions proliferate within 
an individual’s life, such that we as individuals now enjoy multiple and fluid 
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sexualities.  On the contrary, Foucault’s argument is that while sexualities proliferate 
at a society-wide level, each of us is tied down to a single sexuality.  This means that 
there are now more options with respect to the sexual identities that we take on, but 
each of us tends to be reduced to just one of these options.  Moreover, most 
sexualities are understood as ‚abnormalities‛ situated in relation to and with respect 
to their divergence from the norm: this norm is monogamous, heterosexual, 
romantic, and vanilla.  Some of these divergences, such as male heterosexual 
promiscuity, may be more tolerated than others, such as pedophilia, however all are 
situated with respect to a norm that they thereby affirm.  For Foucault, by 
identifying with any sexuality, whether the norm or any one of its variations, we 
reinscribe that norm.47  This – and not straightforward homogenization – is how 
normalization works. 
 
I stress these last points because Williams has misunderstood what Foucault means 
by the perverse implantation.  For Williams, because the modern era is implanted 
and proliferating with perversions and sexualities (partly through the deployment of 
pornography), each of us inhabits multiple perversions or sexualities: 
  
there can no longer be any such thing as fixed sexuality – male, female, or 
otherwise – *<+ now there are proliferating sexualities.  For, if the ‘implantation 
of perversions’ is, as Foucault says, an instrument and an effect of power, then as 
discourses of sexuality name, identify, and ultimately produce a bewildering 
array of pleasures and perversions, the very multiplicity of these pleasures and 
perversions inevitably works against the older idea of a single norm – an 
economy of the one – against which all else is measured.48  
 
As a result, according to Williams, modern sexual identity has become multiple and 
fluid, undermining the notion that there is a single sexuality determined by a phallic 
‚one‛ or norm.  For Williams, the perverse implantation is to be understood as a 
positive Irigaray-esque disestablishment of sexual normalization, and she urges that 
we embrace ‚the liberatory potential contained in the very idea of an ‘implantation 
of perversions.’‛49  The perverse implantation is positive for Williams, results in 
fluid sexualities, and opposes normalization, whereas for Foucault it is largely 
negative, results in fixed sexualities, and imposes a norm through the very 
implantation of abnormalities.  While Williams states that the perverse implantation 
produces new pleasures and opposes the fixing of sexual identity, Foucault is clear 
that it does the very opposite of this, stating, on the same page where he mentions 
pornography and prostitution, that ‚the West has not been capable of inventing any 
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new pleasures, and it has doubtless not discovered any original vices.  But it has 
defined new rules for the game of powers and pleasures.  The frozen countenance of 
the perversions is a fixture of this game.‛50  What the perverse implantation does, 
through the workings of the sex industry as well as the sexual sciences, is to ‚fix‛ or 
‚freeze‛ the face of our sexualities, circumscribing the kinds of pleasure that each of 
us can have by tying us down to specific sexual identities as taxonomized by the 
sexual sciences. 
  
But how do pornography and prostitution implant perversions and contribute to the 
proliferation of sexualities? Not by being confessional, as Williams has claimed in the 
case of pornography, while setting aside the question of prostitution.  Rather, I am 
claiming that the implantation, fixation, or freezing of sexual perversions and 
identities occurs in pornography and prostitution through the subject-forming 
practice of consumption.  Consumers interviewed in Pornified indicate that porn 
consumption exposed them to a range of sexualities and allowed them to figure out 
what they were ‚into.‛  As one 20-year-old, male university student puts it: ‚I was 
able to learn what ‘my type’ is by looking around online – thin women with C- or D-
sized breasts and long dark hair.  Porn gave me a sense of what’s out there and 
exposed me to the kind of stuff I enjoy in real life.‛51  In this way, pornography 
educates viewers in the proliferation of sexualities from which they can choose, but 
then they do choose (or ‚discover‛) their sexuality according to an analysis of their 
desires, as demonstrated by their consumption of pornography.  Pornography thus 
allows viewers to realize a sexuality or taxonomical sexual type, providing them 
with the opportunity to identify with one of many kinds of sexuality.  Each man 
interviewed in Pornified quickly states what his type of pornography is, and often 
what his type of porn star is.  Now he knows the sites that specialize in the things he 
likes.  Every time he types in what he wants to see in his search engine, he self-
consciously reaffirms and reinscribes his sexual type.  It therefore seems that 
pornography allows consumers to experiment with different kinds of pleasures that 
might not otherwise have been available to them and thus allows for a proliferation 
of sexualities; however, pornographic consumption also contributes to an identi-
fication with one kind of sexuality.  Consumption, like confession, is thus productive 
of ontologies, or is one of the many ways in which we identify who we are. 
 
Other pornography-consumers say that they only ever consumed a particular type 
of pornography because of the sexuality with which they already identified or 
wished to identify by the time they had access to pornography.  One man with 
whom I spoke consumes pornography on a daily basis and told me that he has only 
ever watched heterosexual mainstream pornography.  He too states that he has a 
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‚type‛: heterosexual pornography featuring women with large, natural breasts.  
From the start, he was wary of looking at any other kinds of pornography for fear of 
being influenced by them.  If anything ‚abnormal‛ comes onto the screen when he is 
consuming pornography – such as a transsexual, or male homosexual activity – he 
immediately closes the window and searches for something else, not so much 
because the image turns him off but because he does not want to be turned on by it.  
This consumer does not want to explore alternative sexualities or to identify with 
anything other than ‚normal‛ and ‚straight,‛ and thus vigilantly avoids non-
‚normal‛ pornography sites.  This man’s exclusive consumption of heterosexual 
mainstream porn is informed by his identification with and desire for normalcy.  At 
the same time, his preference for straight porn probably does more than simply 
reflect his sexual identity, but shores up and reinscribes it.  The act of shutting the 
window when anything ‚abnormal‛ comes on screen surely reaffirms his sense of 
himself as ‚normal‛ and ‚straight‛ every time.  Likewise, a person with ‚abnormal‛ 
desires who consumes non-mainstream pornography engages in an activity which 
causes him to self-consciously identify with what he himself will understand as an 
‚abnormal‛ sexuality. 
 
Arguably, when sexual initiation and exploration occurs in a more reciprocal and 
less consumerist context, or in the physical presence of other human beings whose 
services one has not purchased, the individual is more likely to respond to the 
desires and limitations placed on him by the other person(s) in the sexual relation.  
There are thus limits to what he can experience, or on the kind of sexual 
consumption he can identify with through his practice, but also, in a non-
consumerist sexual encounter, there are other people’s desires to respond to which 
may go beyond what the individual thought to be his own desires, but in response 
to which he may experience new pleasures.  In contrast, pornography – like 
prostitution – allows the consumer to stipulate, dictate or select exactly what he 
wants every time, and this facilitates falling into a specific typology.  As in the 
prostitute-client encounter, there can always be surprises in what happens in a 
pornographic film, but then one can quickly shut the window, stop or fast-forward 
the DVD, and choose something else.  The fact that the options are almost unlimited 
with pornography – especially with internet pornography – and that this is a 
consumerist rather than a reciprocal sexual activity, in which the object of sexual 
desire is merely a means to one’s (orgasmic) ends, means both that the individual 
has more options and that he can have exactly the option he wants every time and 
nothing but that option if he so chooses.  Although the sex industry opens up many 
new possibilities, it may ultimately and paradoxically curtail the potential for 
surprise, novelty, and sexual exploration, thus limiting rather than setting free.  
According to Paul’s study and my own discussions with consumers of porn, men 
who have consumed pornography over a period of years can no longer fantasize 
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without it, and nor can they be aroused without pornography or real-life sexual 
performances which emulate pornography.  Sociologist Michael Kimmel has found 
that ‚male sexual fantasies have become increasingly shaped by the standards of 
porn.‛52  I would argue that this is increasingly true of female sexual fantasies as 
well, or at least of female sexual behavior as it strives to fulfill the new norms of 
male desire. This indicates pornography’s power to shape our sexual imaginations 
in ways that constrain rather than open up to new possibilities.   
 
As Foucault has shown in the case of confession, we may engage in an activity, such 
as the consumption of pornography, in the belief that we are liberating our sexuality, 
when in fact we are limiting that sexuality, binding it to just one form of sex-desire.  
In this sense, although in a very different manner, consuming pornography, like 
hiring prostitutes, really is comparable to what the sexual sciences do according to 
Foucault’s reading, or is part of the ‚perverse implantation.‛  In so far as 
pornography may also be seen as an erotic art in its offering of technical sexual 
expertise, it is perhaps an art which we do better to eschew in its current mainstream 
forms, whether professional or amateur, since the education it provides is phallo-
centric, masculinist, and normalizing.  Returning to Foucault’s statement, cited 
above, that he should have contrasted the sexual sciences not with Eastern ars erotica 
but with ancient Greek technologies of self-care, I would suggest that what we need 
to do is to explore sexual technologies that function as cares of the self, or, 
alternatively, as ars erotica which conjoin with techne tou biou rather than with the 
scientia sexualis.  Although this is a subject that I must develop further elsewhere, I 
suspect that certain alternative pornographies already function in such a way. What 
I have argued is thus not an absolute critique of all pornography or of all uses of 
pornography, but rather only of mainstream porn and of the specific ways in which 
it tends to be used not for the exploration of bodies and pleasures but for 
‚discovering‛ and satisfying supposedly pre-given sex-desire. 
 
Conclusions  
This paper has argued that it is because the mechanism of consumption works in a 
manner similar to confession – and not because pornography is a confessional 
discourse or a sexual science as Williams has claimed – that Foucault listed 
pornography and prostitution along with medicine and psychiatry in his discussion 
of the perverse implantation in The History of Sexuality.  Whereas Williams has to 
replace the word ‚prostitution‛ with the word ‚law‛ in her reference to this passage 
in order to support her view of pornography as confessional, my account of 
consumption requires no such manipulation and can explain why Foucault includes 
prostitution in his list of normalizing sexual practices.  Similarly, whereas Williams 
needs to strain the definition of confession in order to see pornography as a 
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confessional practice, my focus on consumption more easily makes sense of how 
both pornography and prostitution work.  Understood as practices of consumption 
rather than confession, pornography and prostitution, like psychiatry and medicine, 
are part of the proliferation of sexualities and the perverse implantation: they are, in 
their current mainstream forms and uses, normalizing rather than liberating sexual 
practices.  In the last part of this paper I have indicated how these processes of 
normalization, proliferation, and implantation might take place in the cases of 
pornography and prostitution.  Finally, I have indicated that pornography need not 
function in this normalizing way, and that non-mainstream or alternative forms and 
uses of pornography may already function more positively as techne tou biou or as 
non-normalizing ars erotica.   
 
 
 
